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This paper compares and contrasts the treatment of certain aspects of real property under the civil
codes of Qatar and California, two jurisdictions with very different histories and cultures but
somewhat less different economies and environments. Despite their different starting points, the
two civil codes have created similar, albeit far from identical, structures to achieve similar goals.
This article explores the premise that similar environments - physical, economic, or otherwise -
exert, in the long run, a greater pressure on the development of the law governing real property
than do history and culture. The real property regimes of Qatar and California converge in many
aspects. The nature of the real property right, while couched in civil law terms in one and common
law terms in the other, includes in each case the rights of exclusion, use, enjoyment, and
alienability. The forms of ownership in each vary according to legal tradition, with Qatar using the
simpler civil law forms while California indulges in the more Churrigueresque edifice of estates and
future interests; nonetheless, both ultimately achieve more or less the same ends. The forms of
co-ownership differ to some extent, while private limitations on property rights differ rather less.
The differences in these areas can be traced to cultural differences and to differences inherited by
the two legal systems in question, each itself a hybrid of sorts, from the common law and civil law
traditions. The greatest points of divergence, however, spring from differences in environment. The
different treatment of ownership of land by foreigners provides an example of considerable
divergence. On the other hand, the concept of waqf in Islamic law, incorporated into the Qatar
Civil Code, bears a greater resemblance to the Anglo-American concept of charitable trust
(although the two may have arisen independently) than it does to anything in the civil law
tradition. This article considers the relevant provisions of the two civil codes in order to identify
and, where possible, explain such divergences and convergences, in the hopes of assisting
attorneys and scholars versed in either.
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INTRODUCTION
The law of real property, perhaps more than any other area of law, evolves to suit its environment.
To the extent that property is the central right upon which other legal rights are based,1 this
adaptation to the environment is then reflected in other areas of law. However, the homogenizing
forces of international commerce and political exchange operate on the law relating to movable
goods, ideas, and intangible rights and obligations in a way that they do not operate on real
property. Real property is the most local of all things governed by law; the concept of lex rei sitae
is an inevitable consequence of the nature of real property. It is, by definition, fixed and
immovable; the same authority will always govern it, barring changes in state or national
boundaries. Convergence rather than divergence in real property law should thus occur only where
legal systems share a political and cultural heritage, or where the convergence is necessary to
satisfy the dictates of similar environments. Where the environmental dictates are sufficiently
strong, convergence may occur even where different cultural and historical backgrounds would
otherwise give rise to different normative expectations. This article looks at the treatment of
property in two legal systems, those of California and Qatar. California and Qatar possess radically
different cultures, with little shared history and differing legal traditions. This article attempts to
develop the proposition that, to the extent there is convergence between the two bodies of real
property law, it must result from the similarity of the physical and economic environment in the
two jurisdictions, which differ far less than do the historical and cultural backgrounds.
Property is an economic right.2 It may be true that “in the beginning all the world was America,”3
in the sense that Locke meant it rather than in the unfortunately Eurocentric, imperialist, and
historically inaccurate way he said it. That is, a society has no need of a system of property law
until and unless land has economic value. A society without agriculture, resource extraction
industries, fixed living spaces, and fixed commercial establishments - Locke’s imagined “America,”
quite different from the civilizations his contemporaries were destroying across the Atlantic4 - has
no need of a system of title in land, and thus no reason to expend the energy to create and
maintain it. The development of property law necessarily lags behind the development of property;
just as a society without printing presses has little need of copyright law, a society without farms,
mines, or towns has little need of real property law. Once a society begins to develop an economy
in which the possession of a particular piece of land, and the ability to exclude others from it,
become important, that society will need to develop a system for resolving the inevitable disputes
and, where possible, for preventing those disputes from arising.
Some goals are shared by all systems of real property law; others are specific to that society’s
economy, culture, and geography. In the former category, all societies in which real property has
economic importance need a system of establishing title in land, a system of transferring that title,
and a way of defining and imposing limits on the uses of land. In the latter category, societies
located in areas of water scarcity will place a greater emphasis on riparian rights; those in which
resource extraction is an important industry will place a greater emphasis on separation of surface
and subsurface rights; highly urbanized societies will devote more attention to high-density forms
of property, including apartments and condominiums, and to restrictions on property use. Despite
the similarities noted above, there is divergence as well as convergence; however, divergences
over such issues as the right of foreigners to own real property are probably attributable more to
environmental factors than to cultural or historical ones.
Why choose Qatar and California for comparison, rather than, say, Greenland and Zimbabwe, or
Japan and Ontario? First, there is a purely pragmatic reason - the author’s familiarity with one of
the legal systems in question. Second, the three characteristics described above - water scarcity,
extractive industries, and a high degree of urbanization - are shared by Qatar and by California,
1See, e.g., Carol Rose, Propter Honoris Respectum: Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 329
(1996).
2See, e.g., Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stanford L. Rev. 577 (1988).
3JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, “Of Property” §49 (1689).
4See, e.g., WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061 (2012); Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian
Property Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559 (2001). With regard to the ongoing
problems arising from the treatment of Native American property rights and law, see Joseph Singer, Legal Theory:
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Northwestern U.L. Rev. 1 (1991).
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especially southern California. Many of Qatar’s neighbors share these qualities as well, as does,
say, Western Australia. However, in the case of Australia (to choose one example) matters would
be confused by shared history, culture, and legal traditions. The tenth anniversary of Qatar’s Civil
Code provides an excellent opportunity to examine the development of an emerging legal system
founded of different assumptions outfacing similar challenges.
The comparison between the codes of Qatar and California is not a comparison between civil
law and common law concepts, although that plays a part. Neither is a “pure” civil law or common
law system, if such a thing can be said to exist anywhere in the world today. Rather, both are
hybrids. As a result of California’s colonial history, the California code incorporates property
concepts derived from both the English common law and the Spanish civil law (the latter seen
most dramatically in the law of community property), both generally applied in accordance with
common law concepts of dispute resolution. The Qatar Civil Code5 has similarly complex roots, as
seen in the incorporation by reference of Shari’a in some articles and the concepts of waqf and
hikr, discussed below. There may be some traces of the common law as well, whether as a
memetic relic of British colonialism or the more recent effect of Anglo-American influence in global
legal thought.
It is not possible to cover all of the property law of one state, let alone two, in this brief article.
Instead, this article will focus on the nature of real property, its acquisition, the forms of
ownership, and the limitations on a property owner’s rights. These four areas will be examined
under the laws of Qatar and California, with occasional reference to general common law
concepts. Some areas, such as the different ways in which real property may serve as security for
debt, the role of real property in inheritance law, and the intricacies of landlord-tenant law, exceed
the scope of the present project and will have to await a future article.
I. The nature of real property
Property is a relationship between persons (including juridical persons and governments) with
regard to a thing, place, or idea.6 Although the concept of private property, especially in things,
probably predates the emergence of governments (Locke to the contrary notwithstanding), in all
modern societies the nature and scope of the property relationship are largely or entirely defined
by the state. In states whose legal systems lie within the civil law tradition, this definition is the
result of the refinement and adaptation of the civil code over centuries and even millennia, dating
back through, inter alia, the Siete Partidas, the Code Napoleon and post-Napoleonic codifications,
to the Corpus Juris Civilis7 and, at least in lineage if not in content, to the Twelve Tables and the
Institutes of Gaius. The evolution of property law in the common law tradition has been more
haphazard, owing much to the centuries of ideological conflict between a dynastically-minded,
often barely literate, landowning aristocracy in post-conquest England and the emerging
free-market sensibilities of the contemporary English judiciary.8 Modern common law jurisdictions,
5Law no. (22) of 2004 Regarding Promulgating the Civil Code 22/2004 [hereinafter “Qatar Civil Code.”] Cites in
this work are to the English translation available at http://www.almeezan.qa/lawview.aspx?opt&lawid¼2559&
language ¼ en, except where an alternative translation has been suggested by Dr. Abdelnaser Zeyad Hayajneh of
Qatar University.
6See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION26 (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1977). Law students
in the United States are often introduced to this idea in Armory v. Delamirie, King’s Bench, 1722, 1 Strange 505, and
in Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805). The exact nature of this relationship and the persons,
things, places, and ideas among which it may exist is the subject of considerable discussion, not to mention
litigation; see, e.g., Gregory Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional Law: The Ideology of the
Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1545 (1982); Gregory Alexander, Property as Propriety, 77 Neb.
L. Rev. 667 (1998); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993); Anna di Robilant, Property:
A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 869 (2013); Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52
U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (1985); JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE (Berkeley: U.
of Calif. Press, 1998); Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611 (1988); Laura Underkuffler,
On Property: An Essay, 100 Yale L.J. 127 (1990).
7Available online at http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/Corpus/codjust.htm, visited October 11, 2014 (in Latin).
The Institutes of Justinian, today perhaps the most-studied part of the Corpus Juris Civilis, was originally intended as
a text for beginning law students.
8See, e.g., M.R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8 (1927); John Hudson, Land, Law, and Lordship
in Anglo-Norman England (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997); John Henry Merryman, Ownership and Estate, 48 Tul.
L. Rev. 916 (1974).
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of which California is one, generally achieve the clarity of the civil law approach through the
adoption of a civil code, while retaining common law concepts.
To lawyers in the common law tradition, property is not a single legal right but a bundle of
rights.9 The civil law tradition takes a somewhat different approach; while acknowledging that the
term “ownership” encompasses many aspects, the civil law tradition often assumes that these
aspects are more connected and less separable than they are in the common law tradition.10
It may be helpful to examine the basic principles of property in Qatar and California in some
detail, in order to trace the ways in which similar environments have produced convergent legal
structures, despite the two jurisdictions’ very different starting points, histories, and cultures.
Qatar’s identification of the rights involved in ownership is set out in the Qatar Civil Code at
Articles 837 and 838; the corresponding section of the California Civil Code is section 654. Under
Qatar’s code, “[t]he exclusive owner of a thing shall, within such limits as provided by law, have
the right to use, utilize, and dispose of such thing.”11 In other words, the Qatar Civil Code has
directly adopted the Roman concept of dominium, with its constituent elements usus, fructus, and
abusus - use, fruits (or, as the Qatar Civil Code has it, utilization), and disposal.12 California’s code
provides more or less the same rights, stating, in similar terms, that “[t]he ownership of property is
absolute when a single person has the absolute dominion over it, and may use it or dispose of it
according to his pleasure, subject only to general laws”13 and that “[t]he ownership of a thing is
the right of one or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others.”14 The rights of
exclusion (or possession), use, fruits (or utilization or enjoyment), and alienability (disposal) are
thus present in and central to both systems.
Thus the two codes share compatible, if not identical, notions of the nature of property. This is
an excellent start; but while this is an obvious convergence, it is also, in all likelihood, a fairly
universal one. Without some basic agreement on what property is, commerce and interchange
between legal systems would be difficult or impossible.
The particular form of property with which this article is concerned is property in land, or real
property. Qatar’s code provides that:
1. Any asset of property that is fixed to the Earth and cannot be moved without destroying or
altering it shall be deemed real property; otherwise it shall be deemed a movable asset.15
The California code takes a similar approach:
Real or immovable property consists of:
1. Land;
2. That which is affixed to land.16
Under the California code any rights “incidental or appurtenant to land” (such as the benefit of
an easement appurtenant) are also real property;17 the Qatar code’s nearly identical provision is
that “[e]very real right attached to immovable property shall be deemed real property.”18 Under
both codes, some agricultural or other equipment may be treated as real property even if not
actually attached to the land: In Qatar, “any movable asset placed in real property by the owner
9See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 9; Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 Vanderbilt
L. Rev. 869 (2013); cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Nebraska L. Rev. 730 (1998); but see,
e.g., J. E. Penner, Potentiality, Actuality and Stick-Theory, 8 Econ. J. Watch 274 (2011); J. E. Penner, The “Bundle of
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711 (1996).
10See generally di Robilant, supra note 10. As a side note, both the “bundle of sticks/rights” and “tree” concepts
have unfortunate connotations. A bundle of sticks - fasces - gives fascism its name. And, as di Robilant points out,
id. at 895, “the proving ground for the tree concept was the debate over the new draft Italian Civil Code, which
would be approved in 1942” - that is, in Mussolini’s Italy.
11Qatar Civ. Code art. 837.
12See generally, e.g., Max Radin, Handbook of Roman Law 335–337 (St. Paul, MN: West, 1927).
13Cal. Civ. Code sec. 679. The right to dispose of property in both codes resembles, unsurprisingly, Art. 537 of the
Code Napoleon (1804): “Les particuliers ont la libre disposition des biens qui leur appartiennent, sous les
modifications établies par les lois.”
14Cal. Civ. Code sec. 654. This is the first of two sentences in Section 654; the second reads “In this Code, the
thing of which there may be ownership is called property.”
15Qatar Civ. Code art. 59.
16Cal. Civ. Code sec. 658.
17Cal. Civ. Code sec. 658(3).
18Qatar Civ. Code art. 59(4).
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thereof to serve or to be utilised19 for the service or exploitation of such real property shall be
deemed immovable by reason of its intended use.”20 Again, however, these convergences are, if
not universal, at least widespread. The law of real property has its origins, to a large extent, in the
need to use property for agriculture; all societies in which agriculture exists at all – that is, all
societies except those of the far northern Arctic – can be expected to have evolved a fairly similar
definition.
It is at the next stage that the convergence of the laws of Qatar and California becomes more
apparent. California and Qatar both have economies in which extractive industries play a major
role; as a result, both find it preferable to provide for the separability of surface and subsurface
rights.21 In both jurisdictions, title to land extends above and below the surface, although both
naturally stop short of declaring cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos.22
Throughout the world, the advent of air travel has long made the ad coelum part of this medieval
formulation impractical; where extractive industries are important, the ad inferos part may be
impractical as well. Qatar’s code provides that:
1. Title to the land shall include the surface of the ground and above or in the ground to such
extent useful to enjoy such land upward and downward as applicable.
2. It may be stipulated by law or by agreement that the title to the surface of the ground is
separate from the title to anything above or in the ground.23
California grants a right limited in its upward extent by the needs of air travel, but theoretically
extending ad inferos, in the absence of a separate assignment of subsurface rights:
Land is the material of the earth, whatever may be the ingredients of which it is
composed, whether soil, rock, or other substance, and includes free or occupied space for
an indefinite distance upwards as well as downwards, subject to limitations upon the use
of airspace imposed, and rights in the use of airspace granted, by law.24
As with Article 839(2) of Qatar’s code above, subsurface rights can also be held separately in California.25
Title recording provides another example of convergence. In order to facilitate transactions
involving real property and resolve disputes over title, most modern jurisdictions provide some
form of recording of property interests, including title to easements and other non-possessory
interests, whether through Torrens title,26 recording act,27 cadastre,28 or some other means. Qatar,
like California, relies on recording by private parties - a bottom-up approach, rather than the top-
down approach of Torrens or cadastral assignment of title.29 The Ministry of Justice accepts
registration of instruments affecting title to real property.30 While this convergence may owe
19The English translation uses UK rather than US spellings, and these have been preserved in the excerpted
sections in this article.
20Qatar Civ. Code art. 59(3).
21For more on the history and evolution of the ownership of subsurface rights in American law, see John
G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 982-83 (2008). On Qatar’s state ownership of
subsurface rights, see infra note 57.
22Roughly, “whoever owns the soil owns it up to Heaven and down to Hell,” or, more prosaically, from the center
of the Earth to the farthest reaches of the universe. See, e.g., 2 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, Ch. 2, at 18:
Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards. Cujus est
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, is the maxim of the law, upwards; therefore no man may erect any
building, or the like, to overhang another’s land: and, downwards, whatever is in a direct line between
the surface of any land, and the center of the earth, belongs to the owner of the surface; as is every
day’s experience in the mining countries. So that the word “land” includes not only the face of the
earth, but every thing under it, or over it. And therefore if a man grants all his lands, he grants thereby
all his mines of metal and other fossils, his woods, his waters, and his houses, as well as his fields
and meadows.
23Qatar Civ. Code art. 839.
24Cal. Civ. Code sec. 659.
25See id. at secs. 883.110 et seq.
26See, e.g., Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic.), esp. sec. 41 (“Certificate to be conclusive evidence of title”).
27See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code sec. 1214 (California’s race-notice recording statute), 1213.
28See, e.g., Civil Code of Québec, LRQ, c C-1991, arts. 977, 3026-3045.
29PattonBoggs LLP, Qatar Law Q&A: Property Law Overview, May 2012, http://www.pattonboggs.com/QATAR-
PropertyLaw.pdf (visited October 9, 2014), citing Law No. (14) of 1964.
30Id.
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something to environmental factors, it would be a stretch to ascribe it entirely to economic
convergence, rather than merely to coincidence.
II. The acquisition of real property
Title to real property can be acquired, in most places in the world, by purchase, gift, prescription,
or inheritance, or by the government through the exercise of eminent domain. A possessory right
short of title can also be acquired by lease.31 All of these modes of acquisition exist in Qatar,
although, as will be discussed below, title can, for the most part, be acquired only by Qatari
citizens. Sale and purchase of property are governed under Chapter One32 of the Contracts portion
of the Qatar Civil Code, while barter is governed under Chapter Two33 and gift is governed under
Chapter Three.34 None of these chapters contain elements that would surprise a lawyer from the
common law tradition.
The same is partially true of the law of inheritance. The acquisition of property by inheritance35
largely follows a civil law approach, although “[t]he provisions of the Islamic Shariah and the
relevant laws shall apply to the heirs and the determination of their shares of the estate and the
transfer of the assets of the estate to such heirs.”36 Deathbed gifts are treated as testamentary
acts rather than inter vivos transfers, and thus become part of the estate.37 While this is more
limited in scope than the clawback provisions in the inheritance laws of many civil law countries,38
it may still surprise attorneys from common law jurisdictions. For example, throughout the United
States deathbed gifts are used to avoid estate taxes, and so long as the gift is completed,
(checks, for instance, must be cashed), the gift is not treated as a testamentary act transferring a
part of the estate. In California, for instance, gifts causa mortis are revocable under certain
circumstances.39 If, for example, the giver’s will indicated an intent to revoke a gift causa mortis,
that gift would become part of the estate instead; however, the default setting is that the property
passing by the gift is not part of the estate.40
Another convergence that is more universal than peculiar to Qatar and California can be found
in the law regarding the state’s right to take private property. The Qatar Civil Code reserves or
assigns the power of eminent domain to the state: “No person may be deprived of his property
other than in such events as provided by law and in such manner as contained therein, in
consideration of a fair indemnity.”41 The language used is reminiscent of the corresponding
provision in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: “nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”42
Acquisition of property by prescription (or adverse possession), although not a universal element
of property law, exists in the legal systems of Qatar and California (and all other U.S. states). The
Qatar Civil Code seems to require, as in some U.S. states,43 that the possession be in good
faith,44 although good faith is rebuttably presumed.45 For property owned by the state, the Qatar
Civil Code incorporates the common law maxim, nullum tempus occurrit regi:46
31See generally, e.g., John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property Law (San Francisco: LexisNexis, 3d ed. 2012)
32Qatar Civ. Code arts. 419–487.
33Id. at arts. 488–491.
34Id. at arts. 492–512.
35See id. at arts. 973–1014.
36Id. at art. 973. For a detailed examination of these provisions, see, e.g, DAVID S. POWERS, STUDIES IN QUR’AN AND HADITH:
THE FORMATION OF THE ISLAMIC LAW OF INHERITANCE (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Yasir Billoo, Change And
Authority in Islamic Law: The Islamic Law of Inheritance in Modern Muslim States, 84 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 637
(2007); William A. Coggins, Succession in Traditional Islamic Law, 60 J. Mo. B. 180 (2004).
37Qatar Civ. Code art. 1014.
38For a comparative study of the revocability and inclusion in the estate of gifts inter vivos, see Aaron Schwabach,
Of Charities and Clawbacks: The European Union Proposal on Successions and Wills as a Threat to Charitable Giving,
17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 447 (2011); Aaron Schwabach, The Specter of Civil Law Clawback Actions Haunting US and UK
Charitable Giving, PROBATE & PROPERTY MAGAZINE, May/June 2012, at 60.
39See Cal. Civ. Code sec. 1148; Stout v. McNab, 157 Cal. 356 (Cal. 1910).
40Cal. Civ. Code sec. 5704.
41Qatar Civ. Code art. 840.
42U.S. Const. Am. 5.
43See, e.g, Clymer v. Shawd, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 1080 (Iowa Ct. App.Oct. 12, 2007).
44See Qatar Civ. Code art. 970.
45See id. at arts. 945, 971.
46HENRY OF BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (,1235), available online at Harvard Law School Library,
Bracton Online, Bracton: De Legibus Et Consuetudinibus Angliæ, http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/, visited Oct. 9, 2014.
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1. All immovable or movable property of the state or public juristic persons allocated, either in
fact or by law, for a public benefit shall be deemed to be public funds.
2. In all events, such public funds may not be disposed of, attached or acquired by prescription.47
The California Civil Code contains a similar provision:
Occupancy for the period prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as sufficient to bar any
action for the recovery of the property confers a title thereto, denominated a title by
prescription, which is sufficient against all, but no possession by any person, firm or
corporation no matter how long continued of any land, water, water right, easement, or
other property whatsoever dedicated to a public use by a public utility, or dedicated to or
owned by the state or any public entity, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right
against the owner thereof.48
However, in some circumstances in California, land held by the state but not actually reserved for
or dedicated to a specific public use may be adversely possessed.49 The Qatar Civil Code seems
to permit a similar interpretation, because immunity from prescription extends only to that land
which is both “property of the state or public juristic persons” and “allocated . . . for a public
benefit[.]”50
Divergence: acquisition of real property in Qatar by non-citizens
Divergence, as much as convergence, shows the effect of environment on the evolution of legal
systems. Among the most dramatic points of divergence between Qatar and California in the law
of real property is the law regarding property ownership by foreigners. As with the examples of
convergence, this divergence appears to be the result of environmental factors rather than cultural
or historical ones. California is a large state within a large country; both state and country have
large populations, and most real estate transactions are domestic. It stands more or less at the
opposite end of the spectrum of real estate protectionism from Qatar; the latter is a small country
with a small population and a large number of people both inside and outside the country who
would like to own property within the country.
The different situations of the two real estate markets have led to very different rules. While the
U.S. real estate market is more or less completely open to non-U.S. buyers, Qatar’s is closed.
Both approaches are economically rational: Allowing foreigners to purchase property increases the
pool of prospective buyers, exerting an upward pressure on prices. When this pressure is
relatively small, it benefits property owners without great harm to non-owners living within the
nation’s borders. When, as in the case of Qatar, the external market is potentially larger than the
internal market, the upward pressure on prices may be so great that some local buyers are priced
out of the market. Similar, though not identical, concerns prompted Mexico, a large and
populous country bordering an even larger and more populous one, to adopt similar restrictions
on the purchase of real property by foreigners. Mexico’s 1917 constitution prohibits foreigners
from acquiring direct ownership of lands or waters within one hundred kilometers from the
borders or fifty kilometers from the shoreline.51 The constitutional provision was seen as
necessary to national survival; the previous century had seen the loss of half of Mexico’s national
territory to the United States, a process that began with North American settlers acquiring land
in Mexico.
Qatar law prohibits non-Qataris from acquiring permanent ownership of land in most of the
country.52 Foreigners may acquire usufructs of up to 99 years53 and leases anywhere in the
country,54 and eighteen areas have been opened to foreign ownership, including The Pearl and the
47Qatar Civ. Code art. 57.
48Cal. Civ. Code sec. 1007.
49City of Santa Cruz v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 163 Cal. 538, 126 P. 362 (1912); Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v.
State, 114 P.2d 331, 18 Cal.2d 169 (1941); Fresno Irr. Dist. v. Smith, 136 P.2d 382, 58 Cal.App.2d 48 (1943).
50Qatar Civ. Code art. 57.
51Mexico Const., Art. 27(I): “En una faja de cien kilómetros a lo largo de las fronteras y de cincuenta en las playas,
por ningún motivo podrán los extranjeros adquirir el dominio directo sobre tierras y aguas.”
52Law No. (5) of 1963.
53Qatar Ministry of Municipality & Urban Planning, Real Estate & Housing Units Registration Office for non
Qataries, n.d., http://www.baladiya.gov.qa/cui/view.dox?id=638&siteID=2, visited October 5, 2014; Law No. (17) of
2004; Cabinet Res. No. (6) of 2006. See also generally notes 78-84, infra, and accompanying text.
54See PattonBoggs LLP, supra note 32.
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West Bay Lagoon.55 Citizens of the five Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries other than Qatar
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) have greater opportunities
than non-GCC foreign nationals to acquire real property in Qatar. Each GCC national is permitted
to own as many as three residential properties.56
While Qatar’s restrictions on foreign ownership may not be essential to national survival, as
Mexico’s restrictions were once perceived as being, they are nonetheless essential to national
economic and social well-being. The country’s current prosperity notwithstanding, unrestricted
foreign ownership could result in some of Qatar’s citizens being effectively priced out of Qatar’s
most desirable real estate markets.57
III. Forms of ownership of real property
While the functions performed by property law structures in Qatar and California are often
convergent, the structures themselves are less so, showing the influence of different legal
traditions. The forms of ownership of real property in Qatar differ somewhat from those with which
lawyers in the common law tradition are likely to be familiar. Qatar’s forms of ownership come
from two sources outside the common law tradition: the civil law and Islamic legal traditions. The
glorious complexity of Anglo-American estates and future interests, with their contingent
remainders and executory interests, their possibilities of reverter and life estates pur autre vie, the
Rule in Shelley’s Case and the much-loved Rule Against Perpetuities58 - these are all outgrowths of
a peculiar set of circumstances on a single island in the North Atlantic centuries ago. Civil law
estates and co-ownership are simpler. Although there is considerable variation among the various
countries lumped together within the civil law tradition, in general property is either owned or
leased; where property owned by one person is to be held by another for some period of time,
other than as a lease of the property, there is a usufruct.59 Qatar adds the Islamic concept of
waqf, roughly analogous to the common law charitable trust, to these civil law concepts.
Freeholds, leaseholds, and analogous rights
While California has not preserved the full panoply of estates, future interests, and special rules of
the common law, it still retains more complexity than a lawyer with roots in the civil law tradition
might deem fully necessary. The gaudier excesses of the common law’s golden age, such as the
fee tail, have been done away with.60 However, among the freeholds, California retains not only
the fee simple absolute but also the defeasible fees and the life estate61 (including the life estate
pur autre vie62), and necessarily many of the concomitant future interests.63 The civil law tradition
avoids the complexities created by common law freeholds; the problems of the common law life
estate are largely avoided by the not entirely analogous civil law usufruct.
The immobility of real property dictates that the law regarding real property is necessarily limited
to the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is situated. However, the differences between
the legal traditions seem unlikely to give rise to confusion, given the limitations on ownership of
land in Qatar by foreigners and the unlikelihood that those foreigners from the common law
55See Qatar Ministry of Municipality & Urban Planning, supra note 58; PattonBoggs LLP, supra note 32; Hukoomi:
Qatar E-Government, Real Estate and Property, n.d., http://portal.www.gov.qa, visited October 5, 2014.
56See PattonBoggs LLP, supra note 32.
57In contrast, ownership of subsurface natural gas rights is essential to national survival. In Qatar, though, as in
much of the world (although not the United States) all subsurface mineral rights are held by the state. See Law No.
(3) of 2007 Regarding the Exploitation of Natural Resources and its Sources. These rights are managed by Qatar
Petroleum under Decree Law No. (10) of 1974 Concerning the Establishment of Qatar Petroleum.
58Note, though, that the Qatar Civil Code does prohibit contractual or testamentary restraints on alienation “unless
based on lawful motive and limited to a reasonable period of time.” Qatar Civ. Code art. 850(1). This “reasonable
time,” in contrast to the “life in being plus 21 years” of the Rule Against Perpetuities, is a life in being (without the
additional 21 years): “reasonable time may be for as long as the lifetime of the disposer, or of the person disposed
to, or of a third party.”
59See generally, e.g., ANTHONY HURNDALL,PROPERTY in EUROPE: LAW and PRACTICE (London: Bloomsbury, 1998); Christoph
U. Schmid & Christian Hertel, Real Property Law and Procedure in the European Union, General Report, European
University Institute (EUI) Florence/European Private Law Forum Deutsches Notarinstitut (DNotI) Würzburg (May 31,
2005).
60Cal. Civ. Code secs. 763–764.
61Id. at secs. 761–762, 765.
62Id. at sec. 766.
63Id. at secs. 690–703, 767–769, 773, 778, 780.
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tradition who do manage to acquire ownership of property in Qatar would want to acquire it in
any form other than some analogue of the common law fee simple absolute.
The law regarding leaseholds in common law jurisdictions has come farther from its medieval
roots than has the law of freeholds. Freehold property may change hands as rarely as once in a
human lifetime, slowing the pace of evolution of the law; the turnover for leaseholds is much
higher, and thus the law changes more rapidly. Although provisions regarding leases of both
personal and real property are scattered throughout the codes of both California and Qatar, the
essential rules are laid out in a single chapter of each. In Qatar the core of the law governing
leased property is set out in eighty-eight articles,64 and in California in fifty-nine sections.65 In both
jurisdictions the laws address the formation of a lease,66 the duties of a landlord67 (including the
right of the tenant to quiet enjoyment68 and the duty to provide habitable premises in a
residential lease69), the duties of a tenant,70 and the termination of a lease,71 (including the effect
of a holdover72).
Usufruct
In the civil law tradition, the rough equivalent of the common law life estate is found in the
usufruct. A usufruct allows the holder to enjoy both the use (usus) and the fruits ( fructus) of the
property, much like a life estate. However, a usufruct may be for a period shorter than a person’s
life; in Qatar a usufruct held by a foreigner is limited to 99 years in duration,73 although any
usufruct may terminate earlier on the death of the usufructuary.74
Under the Qatar Civil Code, the “rights and obligations of a usufructuary shall be governed
by the conditions imposed by the deed by which the usufruct is created” as well as by the Civil
Code itself;75 thus, conditions may be imposed under which the usufruct may terminate
prematurely. As is typical of a civil law usufruct, “fruits of the property subject to the usufruct shall
revert to the usufructuary in proportion to the period of his usufruct.”76 As with a life estate, there
is a general duty not to commit waste,77 and the usufructuary bears the burden of normal
maintenance and repairs.78 A usufruct abandoned for the prescriptive period (fifteen years) is
terminated.79
Co-ownership80
California law contains perhaps more forms of concurrent ownership than it truly needs,
fusing common law concepts (although not the tenancy by the entirety) with historic Spanish
community property law. In California, real property can thus be owned in tenancy in common,
in joint tenancy, in tenancy in partnership, or as community property.81 The forms of co-ownership
in Qatar are partnership in common82 and family ownership.83 Partnership in common, as
described in the civil code, seems to have elements of both tenancy in common and tenancy in
64Qatar Civ. Code arts. 582–669.
65Cal. Civ. Code secs. 1940–1954.1, but see also Cal. Civ. Code secs. 1925–1935.
66See, e.g., Qatar Civ. Code arts. 583–589; see also, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code secs. 1943–1944, 1945, 1946, 1946.1,
1950–1950.8.
67Qatar Civ. Code arts. 590–606; see also, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code secs. 1941.3, 1950.7.
68Qatar Civ. Code arts. 593–597; Cal. Civ. Code secs. 1927, 1940.2.
69Qatar Civ. Code art. 591; Cal. Civ. Code secs. 1941, 1941.3, 1942, 1942.1.
70Qatar Civ. Code arts. 607–619; see also, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code secs. 1928, 1941.3.
71Qatar Civ. Code arts. 625–637; Cal. Civ. Code secs. 789,1931–331, 1935, 1946–1946.7, 1947.3, 1950.7, 1951.2,
1980–1993.09.
72Qatar Civ. Code arts. 626–627; Cal. Civ. Code secs. 1944, 1946, 1946.1.
73See PattonBoggs LLP, supra note 32.
74Qatar Civ. Code art. 1023(1).
75Id. at art. 1016.
76Id. at art. 1017.
77Id. at art. 1018; see also Qatar Civ. Code arts. 1020-1021, 1022(2).
78Qatar Civ. Code art. 1019.
79Id. at art. 1025; see also notes 36–38, supra, and accompanying text. The prescriptive period is lengthened to
thirty-three years in the case of waqf property, including hikr where the hikr is itself waqf. See Qatar Civ. Code art.
1042.
80Qatar Civ. Code arts. 873 et seq.
81Cal. Civ. Code sec. 682.
82Qatar Civ. Code arts. 852–878.
83Id. at arts. 879–883.
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partnership as they are understood in California law.84 Family ownership is of fairly limited
duration (up to fifteen years)85 and is subject to many of the same rules as partnership
in common.86 There does not appear to be any equivalent of the right of survivorship in the Qatar
Civil Code, although the code does not seem to prevent purchasers of property from achieving the
same result through a tontine clause (or clause d’accroissement).
Waqf and hikr
Waqf and hikr, even more than civil law concepts such as usufruct, are likely to be unfamiliar to
most lawyers from the common law tradition. The fact that no English, law-Latin, or law-French
word exists stands as evidence of the unfamiliarity of the concept. Despite that unfamiliarity,
though, the concept of waqf may have played an important role in the development of the English
concept of charitable trust, which it both resembles and predates. In a 1988 article, Monica
M. Gaudiosi makes a convincing case that the 1264 statute of Merton College, Oxford sets up a
waqf, which in turn became a model for later charitable trusts.87 As a result, the concept of waqf,
while at first appearing divergent, may actually be grasped more readily by lawyers from the
common law tradition than from the civil law tradition, despite the Qatar Civil Code’s otherwise
largely civil law roots.88
The waqf has two forms: the religious or charitable waqf and the family waqf. The family waqf
may ultimately become a charitable waqf if the family line becomes extinct;89 in this it resembles
a fee tail with a remainder in the religious or charitable institution. Convergence can be seen in
the roles of persons associated with the waqf: the trustor-analogue is a waqif, and the manager, or
trustee-analogue, is a mutawalli. The plural of waqf is awqaf. Waqf property is subject to hikr, in
essence a long-term lease of the waqf property90 and a means of preserving some form of
alienability of property held in the otherwise inalienable and ordinarily perpetual waqf.91
The Qatar Civil Code is especially concerned with the lease, both short term and long term, of
waqf property.92 The trustee, rather than the beneficiary, has authority to lease the waqf
property.93 The trustee may not, of course, abuse this power, and “[w]here the creator of the waqf
determines the term of lease, such determination shall apply and the trustee may not contradict
such determination unless authorized to lease in the best interest of the waqf.”94 The creator of
the waqf, or waqif, also retains some rights to found property on the waqf land95 and to give or
withhold consent to usufruct.96 As noted above, the period for acquisition of title by prescription is
considerably longer for waqf than for non-waqf property - thirty-three years as opposed to
fifteen.97
Hikr is “defined as a contract under which the tenant holds a right-in-kind in a waqf land that
authorizes him to utilize the land by construction of a building, plantation or other installation in
consideration of a particular fee.”98 Hikr requires court approval, and cannot be for a period longer
84Id. at arts. 852-862.
85Id. at art. 880(1).
86Id. at art. 883.
87Monica M. Gaudiosi, The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of the Trust in England: The
Case of Merton College, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1988).
88On the civil law tradition’s sometimes uneasy relationship with trusts and related concepts, see, e.g., Pierre
Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts, 36 Yale L.J. 1126 (1927); Maurizio Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust, 32 Vand.
J. Transnat’l L. 967 (1999).
89See id. See also, e.g., Mohammad Tahir Sabit Haji Mohammad, Alternative Development Financing Instruments
for Waqf Properties, 4 MALAYSIAN J. REAL ESTATE 45 (2009); Andrew White, Breathing New Life into the Contemporary
Islamic Waqf: What Reforms Can Figh [sic; should be fiqh] Regarding Awqaf Adopt from the Common Law of Trusts
without Violating Sharī’ah?, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 497 (2006); Timur Kurana, The Provision of Public Goods under
Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 841 (2001); David S. Powers, The
Islamic Family Endowment (Waqf), 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1167 (1199).
90See Qatar Civ. Code arts. 1029-1042.
91On the termination of waqf, see id. at art. 1039.
92Id. at arts. 661–669.
93Id. at arts. 661–662.
94Id. at art. 665.
95Id. at art. 906.
96Id. at art. 923(2).
97Id. at arts. 966–967.
98Id. at art. 1029.
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than sixty years.99 Unlike usufruct in non-waqf property, however, the hikr does not terminate on
the death of the tenant, unless “the tenant dies before any construction or plantation occurs”;100 it
is freely alienable, and may pass to the tenant’s heirs.101 The hikr tenant must pay rent at fair
market value.102 Any structures or other fixtures placed by the tenant remain the tenant’s property,
and thus freely alienable, rather than becoming part of the waqf property.103 On termination of the
hikr, the owner of the waqf has the option either to demand the removal of the fixtures or
improvements or, upon payment to the tenant, to retain them.104 The hikr may terminate
prematurely if the underlying waqf is terminated or the property otherwise ceases to be waqf land,
or if the tenant fails to pay rent for three consecutive years.105
IV. Limitations on the rights of owners of real property
In closing, it may be interesting to take a preliminary look at the law of private limitations on
property use, in the hopes that the topic can be explored more fully at a later date. The codes of
both California and Qatar provide for such restrictions in addition to limitations imposed by law.106
These show areas of convergence and divergence as well. In both codes, the available remedies
are more or less co-extensive with easements, covenants and servitudes in the common law
tradition, although in Qatar, the absence of a distinction between law and equity eliminates the
need for a distinction between covenants and servitudes; instead, either damages or injunctive
relief may be awarded, as appropriate.107 The Qatar Civil Code incorporates the maxim sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas: “The owner shall not abuse his right to such extent that may cause
damage to a neighbouring property.”108 A landowner “may force his neighbour to demarcate the
boundaries of their adjacent properties,” with the costs being shared equally among them,109 but
may not require the neighbor to build a wall around his property.110 The law of easements
parallels that in California; easements are created expressly111 or by implication,112 including
implication by necessity, although in the latter case the dominant tenant must compensate the
servient tenant.113
Qatar’s code provides for wider use of negative easements than does California’s, or than do
common law jurisdictions generally. Both Qatar and California seem to be in the process of
eliminating distinctions between various types of servitudes. Despite these similarities in overall
trends, there are some occasional striking differences, as in the case of Qatar Civil Code Article
849: “No owner may have openings or holes in his wall overlooking the property of his neighbour
other than within such limits as provided by law.”114 In California no such law exists, and
easements are more likely to protect openings in walls than to prohibit them: “The right of
receiving air, light, or heat from or over, or discharging the same upon or over land” is one of the
proper subjects of an easement.115 It would be interesting, in a future article, to explore the
cultural and environmental factors underlying this divergence.
99Id. at arts. 1030, 1032.
100Id. at art. 1039(2). Even then, the hikr may continue if “all of his heirs demand continuation of the hikr
contract.” Id.
101Id. at art. 1035.
102Id. at art. 1033.
103Id. at art. 1036.
104Id at art. 1041.
105Id. at arts. 1039(3), 1040. Under Article 1039(3), the hikr may outlast the waqf if the property ceases to be waqf
land “due to the cancellation or shortening of the period of such waqf by its creator.”
106See, e.g., Qatar Civ. Code art. 841 et seq.
107Id. at art. 1046.
108Id. at art. 841(1).
109Id. at art. 843.
110Id. at art. 848.
111Id. at art. 1044.
112Id. at art. 1045.
113Id. at art. 842. Easements by necessity were limited in California by Murphy v. Burch, 156 Cal. App. 4th 1434
(2007)(no easement by necessity where landlocked parcel was patent deeded to owner or predecessor in title by
federal government).
114Qatar Civ. Code art. 849.
115Cal. Civ. Code sec. 801(8).
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CONCLUSION
There is no need for the real property law of any jurisdiction to seek to resemble the law of other
jurisdictions, in the manner of law relating to things less fixed to the surface of the earth, such as,
say, copyright or air travel. There will never be a need for a global regime of international property
law to match the global regimes of the Berne Convention116 or the International Civil Aviation
Organization.117 Yet convergence exists and persists nonetheless. Few jurisdictions are as distant
from each other, geographically, historically, and culturally, as Qatar and California; there is no
reason to expect any similarity between their property law regimes, let alone the fairly close
correspondence that actually exists. Specific laws may differ, but all lawyers expect such
differences: One jurisdiction treats a particular piece of agricultural machinery as real property,
while another does not; one requires compensation for an implied easement, another does not.
To the extent that two legal systems face similar problems with limited solutions, convergence is
likely. Where the problems faced are different, the legal structures created to deal with those
problems will diverge as well. The answer to specific legal questions will vary among jurisdictions
and even, over time, within a single jurisdiction, as the polity changes its collective mind. The
questions, however, remain the same, both across jurisdictions and over time. We have examined
a few of those questions here: What is real property? How is real property acquired? What forms
does ownership of real property take? What limits must or may be imposed on some property
owners for the benefit of others? Even where the answers seem at first surprising or confusing,
closer examination reveals enough common ground for a mutually beneficial understanding.
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